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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Petition seeks review of an opinion of the Utah Court 
of Appeals which was entered on December 19, 19 90. This case was 
transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on January 23, 1990- Jurisdiction was originally vested 
in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII Section 3 of the Utah State Constitution, U.C.A. Section 78-
2-2 (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3 (2)(j) 
(1953 as amended), and Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Jurisdiction is once again vested, as originally, in 
the Utah Supreme Court. Review by writ of certiorari is 
imperative because the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS - UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
31A-21-303 Termination of insurance policies by insurers. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in 
other statutes, or by rule under Subsection (l)(c), 
this section applies to all policies of insurance other 
than life and disability insurance and annuities, if 
they are issued on forms which are subject to filing 
and approval under Subsection 31A-21-201(1). 
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(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to 
insureds than this section requires. 
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially 
exempt from this section classes of insurance policies 
in which the insureds do not need protection against 
arbitrary or unannounced termination. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (c), no 
insurance policy may be cancelled by the insurer prior 
to the expiration of the agreed term or one year from 
the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever 
is less, except for failure to pay a premium when due 
or on grounds stated in the policy. As used in this 
subsection, "grounds" means: 
(i) material misrepresentation; 
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed, 
unless the insurer should reasonably have foreseen 
the change or contemplated the risk when entering 
into the contract; 
(iii) substantial breaches of contractual 
duties, conditions, or warranties; 
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the 
terminal age for coverage, in which case the 
insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection 
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional 
return of premium; or 
(v) in the case of automobile insurance, 
revocation or suspension of the driver's license 
of the named insured or any other person who 
customarily drives the car. 
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or 
first class mailing of a written notice to the 
policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsection 
(2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium, 
is effective. Cancellation for nonpayment of premium 
is effective no sooner than ten days after delivery or 
first class mailing. Notice of cancellation for 
nonpayment of premium shall include a statement of the 
reason for cancellation. Subsection (6) applies to the 
notice required for other grounds of cancellation. 
The complete text of U.C.A. section 31A-21-303 is included 
in the Appendix. Other sections included in the Appendix are 
31A-21-201, 31A-21-304 and 70C-6-304. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, alleging breach of insurance contract and 
bad faith denial of insurance claim (R.l-5). On cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the facts presented to the trial court were 
undisputed, excepting certain extrinsic and parol evidence (R.93, 
94, 118, 195). Plaintiff objected to the court's consideration of 
extrinsic and parol evidence presented by the Defendant (R. 94, 
95, 146, 177, 178; T.5, 9, 10). The court did in fact consider 
and rely upon such extrinsic and parol evidence in formulating 
its ruling and order, and granted summary judgment to Defendant 
(R.196, 197, 204-206). The court found that the subject 
insurance contract terminated of its own terms prior to the date 
of Plaintiff's loss, and that notice of cancellation of insurance 
was not necessary to make such termination valid (R.197, 206). 
Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals ignored 
the extrinsic and parol evidence, considering only the "basic 
policy and amendment", but affirmed ruling as a matter of law 
"that the insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance 
coverage terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the 
note." (Appendix A, p.3). Although it completely omitted 
discussion of statutory requirements for cancellation notices, the 
Court of Appeals further held that a distinction between 
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"cancellation" and "terminal i c v ~- t- * r<: -. • ; 
notice of cancellation to Plaintiff/Petitioner• 
STATEMENT 01 FACTS 
On or about December 20, 1983, Petitioner Stuart 
("Stuart") purchaser n: Deere Backhoe through a retail 
installment coniic: ,'^ eit: i -.-: :^ Equipment Company 
(R.7, 28, 3 ^ Property insurance was provided by John Deere 
Insurance Company (R.9, 27, 28). The loan was to be paid in lull 
on April 1, <- • - . > , 
The insurance policy which was issued by the seller's 
affiliate John Deere Insurance company and in tot:cf at the t Line of 
ilit (unehd i ill i ne backhoe was an updated inland marine pol I cy, 
Policy No. IM-14319, dated January 1, 1982 (the "contract") (R.64, 
65, 67) . The contract * » * : -.'.*•' s 
iiisiirance coverage was Apri > Insurance 
coverage was effective from December 20, 1983 until Apr: i?oo 
according to the Retail Contract Acceptance Form which included a 
Certificate of Physical Damage Insurance (R.9). In addition, the 
front page of the actual policy stated that it was in effect from 
January 1, 1982 Cancelled" (R.67). Thus, barring default 
or other such event terminating the insurance prematurely, the 
backhoe was to be insured through April 1, 1988, under siiclI policy 
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(R.29, 30)- Stuart made all insurance payments, made all 
installment payments, and generally performed all its obligations 
under the purchase contract for the backhoe on a timely basis 
(R.2, 3, 4, 7, 17, 28, 39-44). A lump sum insurance premium of 
$2,972.29 was paid by Stuart for physical damage insurance 
coverage on the backhoe for the entire contemplated term of 
coverage between December 20, 198 3 and April 1, 1988 (R.7,9). 
Defendant/Respondent John Deere Insurance Company did not 
terminate the insurance on the backhoe under the cancellation 
provisions of the Insurance Contract, nor did it terminate 
insurance coverage in compliance with any Utah statute relating 
to cancellation of insurance. It never gave notice of 
cancellation to Stuart prior to April 1, 1988 (R.119, 125). 
On or about February 5, 1988, Stuart made a final payment on 
its obligation under the backhoe installment purchase contract, 
paying the purchase obligation in full earlier than required (R. 
28). However, the UCC filings evidencing the security interest 
of John Deere in the backhoe remained in place as of March 9, 
1988, and had not been formally released (R. 32;T. 17) . On March 
9, 1988, the backhoe was destroyed by a fire of unknown origin. 
Stuart made its claim in a timely fashion under the insurance 
contact. Respondent John Deere Insurance Company denied the claim 
(R.28). 
6 
Responden t intern a J 1 j c r e d i 1: e ci S t ; u a i: t ' s • • L C C o u :I: I t i i I 1 h e 
insurance company's records for unearned insurance premiums on or 
about February 5 , 1 9 8 8 (R. 44 ) However, Stuart d Id nc 1 actually 
receive a n re f u:i Ici of I ineai : i Ieci i i IsI 11:ance • pi: em i I Ims i Ii I L i 1 after 
the fire destroyed the backhoe on March 9, 1989 (R.44; T" 1 7) 
The insurance contract va- prepared unilaterally by John 
Deere Ii ISU rai i M . . . . ... -ithpr saw nnr read the 
actual insurance policy until after the Marcl . 1 988 fire 
destroyed the backhoe (R.64, 124). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
STATUTORY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS PRECLUDE 
TERMINATION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE WITHOUT PROPER 
PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF SUCH TERMINATION. 
This petition for writ cf ceri iorai sh -id r granted 
because ' • - * ^ , t-i - , s . i • i ,\ ; pecj i statute 
a n H \ +, nderlyiny public policy \\\^r- expressly prohibit 
cancellation or termination of insurance coverage without advance 
notice to the insured Its opini !. : • ^  not mention the statute. 
In order to provide an important "protection against 
arbitrary or unannounced termination", the 1itah Legislature 
enacted section Jhapter 2] c £ I he Insurance Code. U.C.A. 
Section 31A-21-303(1)(c). The heading of that section reads: 
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"Termination of insurance policies by insurers." Except under 
limited circumstances not relevant here, Section 303 prohibits an 
insurer from cancelling an insurance policy without first 
providing written notice of the intended termination. By 
requiring cancellation notices, the section fosters the important 
social policy of avoiding uninsured losses. The mailing of a 
simple cancellation notice does not seem burdensome. Respondent 
seeks to abdicate its responsibility as an insurance company to 
give the simple and inexpensive termination notices that could 
avoid the catastrophic uninsured losses such as occurred here. 
Whether an insurer can avoid compliance with section 303 by 
inserting automatic termination language in an insurance policy 
is an important question of state law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Supreme Court of Utah. It should be 
answered with a resounding "NO!" 
Respondent successfully contended below that the subject 
insurance contract silently terminated without any requirement of 
notice of cancellation to the insured. However, the law of the 
State of Utah precludes arbitrary or unannounced termination, 
unless a class of insurance has been exempted from protection 
from unannounced termination. See, U.C.A. Section 31A-21-
303(1)(c). The subject insurance contract does not fall under 
such an exempted class of insurance. The statute is in accordance 
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with the general rule of law stating that provisions for notice of 
cancellation of insurance policies are intended to prevent 
cancellation of a policy without allowing the insured ample time 
to obtain other insurance. Seef Taxter v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 
721 P.2d 972f 974 (Wash. App. 1986); Crowley v. Lafevette Life 
Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 858 (Idaho 1984). Thus, Utah law requires 
notice of cancellation, and does not allow secret termination of 
insurance coverage. The minimum notice required before 
termination is either ten (10) days or thirty (30) days after 
delivery of notice of cancellation, depending on the type of 
policy and reason for cancellation. U.C.A. Section 70C-6-304; 
U.C.A. Section 31A-21-303(2)(b) and (3). 
Although Stuart argued that statutory restrictions precluded 
silent terminations, the Court of Appeals erred in completely 
failing to address the issue. Instead, the Court of Appeals 
summarily held that no notice was "required by the policy" 
because a "termination," as opposed to a "cancellation" had 
occurred. Such distinctions are without a meaningful difference 
when it comes to providing the important protection the Utah 
legislature sought to afford to consumers. Note that the very 
heading to section 303 of the Insurance Code is entitled 
"Termination of insurance policies by insurers." 
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The general rule under section 303 requires notice be given 
of cancellation or termination. Exceptions, none of which apply 
here, are specifically enumerated. However, one of the exceptions 
is significant. U.C.A. section 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv) is one of the 
allowable "grounds" that may be stated in the policy for 
cancellation. Although it appears to be an exception to the 
general rule, it specifically requires cancellation notice where 
the insured has attained "the age specified as the terminal age 
for coverage." U.C.A. 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv). In such a case, even 
though all parties anticipate at the outset that coverage will end 
at a "terminal age", notice is still required once that 
termination event is reached. Even though such a policy is 
expected to expire by its own terms at a specified time, the 
legislature imposed the minor burden of cancellation notices upon 
the insurer to avoid the catastrophic burden of uninsured losses 
on an insured who may not have read, understood, or remembered the 
fine print termination provisions. That represents a well 
reasoned and rational legislative decision. Thus, the Utah 
legislature clearly contemplated that cancellation notice must 
precede every termination, whether it properly be called a 
cancellation or not. 
One limited exception exists where the termination is for 
nonpayment of premiums at the normally scheduled expiration date 
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occurring at the "end of the one-year policy term." Clarke v. 
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Ut. App. 1988). In 
that situation no "reminder" notice of cancellation is needed 
because the insured obviously knows of his own present delinquency 
in making premium payments. In this case, however, the contract 
was not scheduled to expire until April 1, 1988. Premiums had 
been fully paid nearly five years previously through April 1, 
1988. 
The Respondent admitted (R. 119, 125), that it did not give 
notice of either termination or cancellation. In addition, no 
constructive notice of termination or cancellation was given prior 
to time of loss, whereas Plaintiff did not receive a full refund 
of insurance premiums until after the date of loss (R.44; T.17), 
nor did John Deere formally release its security interest in the 
backhoe prior to March 9, 1988 (R.32; T.17). Therefore, any 
termination of the Plaintiff's insurance coverage was a secret 
termination, which is not allowed by either law or public policy 
in Utah, even if it could be construed as being authorized by 
"boilerplate" language in an insurance contract drafted 
unilaterally by the insurance company. The Utah legislature 
recognized that is unrealistic to expect the layman to have read, 
understood, and remembered (for five years here) technical fine 
print provisions regarding termination. Therefore, by statute it 
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prohibited shifting the enormous risk of uninsured losses to 
Petitioner as a result of Respondent's failure to give any 
"reminder" notice of cancellation. For sound public policy 
reasons, the insurer, by its artful drafting cannot evade the 
responsibilities imposed by the Utah legislature. 
This is an important question of state law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court of Utah, An 
insurance company must not be allowed to terminate coverage 
without prior written notice, even if the contract provisions 
would seem to permit it. To hold otherwise flys in the face of 
the statute, undermines the security and reasonable expectations 
of insured persons, and increases the likelihood of unnecessary 
and unexpected losses which are not insured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II: 
THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE IN THE AMENDED 
INSURANCE CONTRACT ON WHICH THE COURT COULD 
BASE ITS DECISION THAT INSURANCE COVERAGE 
TERMINATED AUTOMATICALLY PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 
1988, AND WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE INSURED. 
Even if there were no important public policy reasons 
codified by the legislature which preclude silent terminations, 
the contract itself did not allow such in this case. While the 
contract originally purported to sanction such conduct by the 
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Respondent, an endorsement or amendment eliminated that language. 
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in construing the 
amendment. 
The Trial Court correctly held the "contract" consisted only 
of the actual policy and the endorsement. Finding the "contract" 
integrated, clear, and unambiguous, the trial court and the Court 
of Appeals ruled as a matter of law regarding its interpretation. 
Upon review the Supreme Court should accord neither court's 
construction any particular weight, and should review the 
interpretation under the correctness standard. Craig Food 
Industries, Inc. v. Weihinq 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987); 
Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals held that the 
insurance contract terminated automatically on February 5, 1988, 
pursuant to the second sentence of the original Item 3 of the 
contract. The entire Item 3, (cons* ting of only two sentences) 
before amendment, "reads as follows:" 
ATTACHMENT OF INSURANCE 
3. The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those 
items of merchandise on which, according to the Named 
Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the time the 
financing agreement was made and as respects each such item, 
the insurance shall attach as of (a) the time the Additional 
Insured takes possession thereof of (b) the time of 
execution and acceptance of the note, whichever occurs 
first. This insurance terminates when the actual maturity 
date of the note is reached or the date on which the 
security interest of John Deere in said equipment 
terminates, whichever first occurs. 
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Because of the second sentence, Respondent argues that early 
payment by Stuart of the obligation on the backhoe in full on 
February 5, 1988 resulted in the automatic and unannounced 
termination of the insurance contract, and that John Deere 
Insurance Company did not have to comply with the notice 
requirements under the cancellation provisions of the contract or 
under Utah State law to have this termination take effect (R.29-
33, 68, 119-121). The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to rule 
as to the applicability of the statutory cancellation notice 
requirements and should be reversed on that basis alone. (See, 
Point I, supra). Moreover, reversal is mandated because it 
further erred as a matter of law in construing the amended 
insurance contract. Using these significant prefatory words, the 
contract was "amended to read as follows:" by an endorsement 
provision effective September 1, 1983, omitting the automatic 
termination language (R.81). Relevant to Item 3, the Endorsement 
states: 
This endorsement issued by the John Deere Insurance Company 
forms a part of the policy number stated herein and takes 
effect as of the effective date also stated herein. ... 
It is agreed Item 3, Attachment of Insurance, is 
amended to read as follows: 
Attachment of Insurance 
3. The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to 
those items of financed merchandise or additional 
security on which, according to the Named 
14 
Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the 
time the financing agreement was made. As 
respects each item of financed merchandise, the 
insurance shall attach as of (a) the time the 
Additional Insured takes possession thereof of (b) 
the time of acceptance of the note by John Deere, 
whichever occurs first. As respects each item of 
additional security, the insurance shall attach as 
of the time of acceptance of the note by John 
Deere. 
In amending the contract, Respondent completely omitted the 
previous second sentence which purported to allow silent and 
automatic termination (R.68, 81). The small pre-printed portion 
at the bottom of the Endorsement form stated: "Nothing herein 
contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter or extend any of 
the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the policy 
other than as herein stated" (R.81). Here, the specific 
endorsement did expressly state how the entire amended Item 3 was 
"to read" in full. It did not state that only the first sentence 
of Item 3 was "amended to read as follows." It was "Item 3" that 
was amended, not the first sentence of Item 3. Furthermore, the 
contract contained a provision under paragraph 22 entitled 
"Additional Conditions," that stated: "All conditions of the 
printed policy that are at variance or in conflict with the terms 
and provisions of any endorsement attached to said printed policy 
are hereby waived" (R.74). After amendment, Item 3 in the printed 
policy was "at variance" with the revised Item 3 as contained in 
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the endorsement. Thus, the only proper construction of the 
contract after the replacing amendment is that no automatic 
termination language survived. 
In an attempt to show that the omission of the termination 
sentence was merely a unilateral typographical mistake, Defendant 
introduced documents extrinsic to the Insurance Contract (the 
Installment Contract and the Acceptance Form) and parol evidence 
in the form of the Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky (R.27, 29-31, 
121-125, 128- 137). Although they were improperly considered by 
the trial court over Plaintiff's objections, the Court of Appeals 
ignored them in its Opinion. It stated that they were "not 
relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion because the contract was 
unambiguous." (Appendix A). Because those documents are 
extrinsic or parol evidence, the Supreme Court, as did the Court 
of Appeals, should disregard such evidence in formulating its 
interpretation and construction of the subject Insurance Contract. 
See, Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Zumstein, 675 P.2d at 734; 
Stanqer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P. 2d at 1205. The 
Insurance Contract here is integrated and unambiguous, and 
accordingly, the evidence proffered by Defendant on this issue 
should be ignored. Note also, that any such error would be 
Respondent's unilateral mistake, and not a basis for reformation. 
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This insurance contract was drafted unilaterally by the 
insurance company Respondent and the general rule of contract 
interpretation in Utah would require that any ambiguous contract 
language be construed against the party who drafted it and 
favorably towards the other party against whom it is invoked. 
See, Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America 669 P.2d 410, 417 
(Utah 1983); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty and Fin. 
Inc. , 544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975). That favoritism is not even 
needed here, however, as there simply is no ambiguity. The 
amended paragraph 3 clearly varied from the original and was 
expressly made an entire replacement when it was amended "to read 
as follows." These four underlined words were apparently also 
overlooked by the Court of Appeals, as they are not even mentioned 
in the opinion. Those four significant words allow for no 
interpretation other than that a complete substitution occurred. 
Being so amended, the policy at issue gives absolutely no 
indication, within its four corners, that the contract will 
terminate or expire by its own terms anytime prior to the date of 
maturity of the original note (April 1, 1988). An insurance 
contract which contains no terms by which the contract may expire, 
cannot, as a matter of law (as well as a matter of common sense), 
expire by its own terms. Where no terms describing the means of 
expiration existed in the contract, expiration simply could not 
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occur prior to cancellation, even if statutes and public policy 
would otherwise allow it. Here, statutes and public policy 
prohibit it, and the amended contract does not allow for it. 
Requirements for cancellation are codified by statute in 
Utah, See, U.C.A. Section 31A-21-303(2)(b) and (3); U.C.A. 
Section 70C-6-304. Clarke v. American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P. 2d 
470, 473 (Ut. App. 1988). The Court of Appeals erred when it 
failed to even address the statutory requirements. Under those 
statutes, John Deere was required to give at least ten (10) days 
notice, and as much as thirty (30) days notice, prior to 
cancellation. Id. Respondent, by its own admission, failed to 
comply with the contract's terms and the statutory requirements 
regarding cancellation notices (R.119, 125). There being no 
contract provision dealing with termination of insurance, and 
because there was no cancellation prior to the time loss occurred 
on March 8, 1988, the insurance was still in full force and effect 
at the time the Plaintiff's property was destroyed. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court should reverse the affirmance by the Court of 
Appeals of the trial court's decision and award summary judgment 
to the Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner on its Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
This case concerns important social policies that the Utah 
legislature safeguarded by enacting U.C.A. 31A-21-303. As an 
18 
insurance company, Respondent can not be allowed to evade its 
responsibilities. Otherwise, dangerous precedent will be set 
that dilutes the protections and policy carefully enacted as law 
in the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in granting Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in not granting Petitioner's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Affirmance by the Court of Appeals was also 
reversible error. Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner, therefore, 
requests the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and the 
lower court's Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint 
with Prejudice, and to grant summary judgment to Petitioner on its 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1991. 
Jiowjlas M. Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
David L. Miller 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant/Petitioner 
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Stuart, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
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John Deere Insurance Company, 
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DEC 19 1390 
<*Wry T Noonan 
Clem cure Court 
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OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900052-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 19, 1990) 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Attorneys: Douglas M. Durbano, Paul H. Johnson and David 
Miller, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark 0. Morris, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Stuart, Inc. (Stuart) appeals from a summary judgment 
dismissing its claim of breach of contract. Stuart asserts 
three claims of error: (1) there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether the insurance contract was an 
integrated document; (2) the trial court improperly derived the 
intent of the parties from extrinsic and parol evidence; and 
(3) the trial court erred in finding that the insurance 
contract terminated prior to April 1, 1988, without notice of 
cancellation. Stuart claims that any one of the above errors 
would preclude the trial court from granting summary judgment 
to John Deere Insurance Company (John Deere). Thus, Stuart 
asserts that we should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on John Deere*s motion and grant the 
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from John 
Deere Industrial Equipment Company on a retail installment 
contract. John Deere issued an insurance policy covering the 
backhoe. On February 5, 1988, Stuart made the final payment on 
the installment contract. On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was 
destroyed by fire. Stuart made a claim under the insurance 
contract, which was denied by John Deere.1 
On August 1, 1988, Stuart filed a complaint alleging 
breach of contract by John Deere. After oral arguments, based 
on the stipulated material facts, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of John Deere* Stuart appealed. 
ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW 
Stuart first argues that there was an issue of material 
fact pending before the trial court. Stuart asserts that 
whether the contract was ambiguous or integrated concerning the 
parties* intent is a factual question. Here, Stuart is 
confusing two separate doctrines of contract law. These 
doctrines concern (1) whether a written contract is fully 
integrated so as to trigger the parol evidence rule; and (2) 
whether a provision of a written contract is ambiguous so that 
extrinsic evidence must be considered to construe it. 
First, whether a contract is an integration is a question 
of fact. Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 
183 (Utah 1983). If the contract is not integrated, parol 
evidence is admissible to determine the parties* intent even if 
it means varying a term of the written part of the parties' 
overall agreement. Here, Stuart did not raise any facts 
suggesting the parties had any agreement or understandings 
other than as set out in the written contract documents. 
The second legal doctrine concerns whether any material 
term of the contract is ambiguous. "Interpretation of a 
written contract is ordinarily a question of law, and this 
court need not defer to the trial court's construction." Jones 
v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Provo Citv Corp. v. 
Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). "Contract 
provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that 
the parties urge diverse interpretations." Jones, 611 P.2d at 
735. While extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist in the 
interpretation of ambiguous terms, the threshold question of 
whether a provision is ambiguous is a question of law. See, 
e.g., Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
1. Both of the parties stipulate that these are the undisputed 
material facts of the case. 
We find the provisions of the basic policy and amendment to be 
entirely unambiguous, as did the trial court. Thus, we 
construe the critical contractual provisions as a matter of law, 
The primary policy of the insured contained the following 
termination provision: "This insurance terminates when the 
actual maturity date of the note is reached or the date on 
which the security interest of John Deere in said equipment 
terminates, whichever first occurs." An amendment to the 
policy was made on September 1, 1983, without mention of the 
above termination provision. The amendment to the original 
policy contained the following saving language: "Nothing 
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend 
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the 
policy, other than as herein stated." The trial court 
concluded as a matter of law that, after the above amendment, 
"the basic policy . . . remained the same, including that 
aforementioned statement concerning termination of the policy 
when the security interest of John Deere was satisfied." We 
agree with the trial court's legal determination. When Stuart 
paid the debt, John Deere no longer had an insurable security 
interest in the backhoe. Thus, the insurance policy coverage 
ended when Stuart paid off the balance owing on the retail 
installment contract. We conclude as matter of law that the 
insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance coverage 
terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the note. 
Although the trial court had before it certain extrinsic 
evidence, it was not relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion 
because the contract was unambiguous. Thus, we need not 
consider Stuart's second issue further. 
EXPIRATION OR CANCELLATION 
Stuart also claims that John Deere cancelled the policy 
without prior notice to the insured as required by the policy. 
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion that 
John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation" in the 
insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon, or cancel < 
contract of insurance. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 380 (1982). 
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such action 
was not necessary. The policy expired based upon its own 
terms. "The usual effect of a termination of a policy is the 
termination of coverage thereunder, and where a policy expires 
by its own terms . . . at a specified time, generally no basis 
exists thereafter upon which to predicate a recovery." 43 Am. 
Jur. 2d Insurance § 237 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Here, the 
policy was not cancelled as Stuart claims, but instead expired 
900052-CA 3 
pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties. The policy 
contained a provision that it would terminate when John Deere 
Industrial Equipment Company's security interest in the backhoe 
terminated. When Stuart paid off the backhoe, John Deere 
Industrial Equipment Company had no further insurable interest 
in the backhoe. Thus, the policy expired simultaneously with 
the expiration of John Deere Industrial Equipment Company's 
interest in the backhoe and notice was not required. We affirm, 
Norman H. Jackson^Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the -«•• 
County of Davis, State of Utah :. _ _ jS. . 
STUART, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN DEERE INSURANCE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I RULING ON MOTIONS 
I Civil No. 43933 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment and the 
plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment came before the 
court for oral argument on September 5, 1989, with Douglas M. 
Durbano appearing for the plaintiff and Mark 0. Morris appearing 
for the defendant. After oral argument, the court took the 
motions under advisement. The court now rules on the motions. 
In the defendant's memorandum, page three, there was a 
statement of undisputed material facts. Both of the parties 
stipulate that these are the undisputed material facts of the 
case. About December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from 
John Deere on a retail installment contract. The defendant 
issued an insurance policy covering the backhoe. On February 5, 
1988, Stuart made the final payment on his obligations under the 
contract. On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was destroyed by fire. 
Both parties agree that this case can be decided by reference to 
the policy. It is therefore a law question for the court to 
decide. 
The legal arguments that the parties focus on are found in 
paragraph three, page one of the policy which states as follows: 
"This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date of the 
note is reached or the date on which the security interest of 
John Deere in said equipment terminates, whichever occurs first." 
FILMED 
The plaintiff was in receipt of two documents. One was 
called a certificate of physical damage insurance. The other is 
the installment note. Both documents make it clear that "the 
insurance shall terminate immediately without notice if any one 
of the following events occur: The indebtedness is discharged; 
John DeereT s security interest in the property which is the 
subject of the contract terminates." These documents are not 
part of the insurance contract because they are not issued by the 
defendant, but they are indications of what the parties intended 
to contract with the insurance company. The plaintiff refers to 
a policy amendment which amended the primary policy but did not 
include the clause "this insurance terminates when the actual 
maturity date of the note is reached or the date in which the 
security interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates 
whichever first occurs." The purpose of the amendment was to 
include other security and was not intended to change the terms 
of the policy itself. The endorsement states that "nothing 
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend 
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the 
policy, other than as stated herein." The basic policy, 
therefore remained the same, including that aforementioned 
statement concerning termination of the policy when the security 
interest of John Deere was satisfied. It is also important to 
note that when the contract was paid off by the plaintiff, John 
Deere refunded the balance of the unearned insurance premium to 
the plaintiff. It is also of interest to the court that the 
plaintiff never actually saw the policy itself until after the 
destruction of the insured property. John Deere Company was the 
primary insured party and the plaintiff was only secondarily 
insured. 
The termination of insurance provision does not appear in 
the endorsement due only to a typographical error. This was a 
mistake on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff was not even 
aware of the provisions of the policy or the typographical error 
and did not rely on it until after the loss of equipment. 
The plaintiff also complains that the defendant cancelled 
the policy. This is not borne out by the facts in the case. The 
insurance contract terminated naturally by the payment in full of 
the proceeds of the installment note to John Deere and was not 
cancelled by the defendant. The defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is therefore granted and the plaintiff's cross motion 
for summary judgment is denied. 
The defendant is ordered to draw a formal order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated September 13, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
r r ,.•' / 
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JUDGE— 
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84145-0385 on September 14, 1989. 
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Mark 0. Morris (A4636) u - - -•-• 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: 801 532-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STUART, INC., a Utah : 
corporation, 
: ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, AND DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT 
: WITH PREJUDICE 
vs . 
JOHN DEERE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, : Civil No. CV-43933 
Defendant. : 
ooOoo 
Defendant John Deere Insurance Company's ("John Deere") 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff Stuart, Inc.'s 
("Stuart") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment came on for regularly 
scheduled hearing on September 5, 1989. Mark O. Morris appeared 
on behalf John Deere. Douglas M. Durbano appeared on behalf of 
plaintiff. Based upon the parties' memoranda, the affidavits on 
file, and oral argument, and pursuant to Rules 52, 54, and 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact. 
01 Hen 
FINDINGS OF T^S^/U^^ 
1. On or about December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a 
1984 John Deere 510B Wheel Loader Backhoe, serial no. BF707463 
through a retail installment contract ("Contract") with John 
Deere. Property insurance was provided to Stuart in connection 
with this purchase through John Deere. The loan was to be paid 
off by April 1, 1988. 
2. Part of the Contract included a Certificate of 
Physical Damage Insurance, which states, in part, "The insurance 
shall terminate immediately without notice if any one of the 
following events occurs: the indebtedness is discharged; John 
Deere1s security interest in the property which is the subject of 
the contract terminates. . . . " Under the Contract's section 
entitled "ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES", it states, in part, 
"If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I (we) will 
be furnished a certificate which describes the insurance. Such 
insurance shall terminate if the indebtedness is discharged, or if 
the holder's security interest in the equipment terminates . . . 
." All documents received by Stuart at the time of purchase 
contained language similar or identical to that quoted above. 
3. The insurance policy that covered the Backhoe and 
under which Stuart makes its claim, is an inland marine policy, 
number IM-14319 ("Policy"). A true ahd correct copy of the Policy 
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7. On March 9, 1988, the Backhoe was destroyed by a 
fire of unknown origin; thereafter Stuart made its claim under the 
Policy, which claim was denied by John Deere. 
8. Stuart did not see the Policy until after the 
Backhoe's fire, nor did Stuart rely upon the September 1, 1983 
amendment to the Policy prior to the Backhoe's fire. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW / / V ^ 
1. This Court concludes that on February 5, 1988, upon 
the discharge of Stuart's indebtedness and the termination of John 
Deere's security interest, and upon Stuart's receiving a credit 
for the unearned insurance premium, the Policy terminated, of its 
own terms. 
2. The Policy was not cancelled by John Deere. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Defendant John Deere Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff Stuart, Inc.'s 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
It is hereby Ordered that Plaintiff's Complaint against 
Defendant be dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits 
-' / s<- ' 
DATED this ^ day of -September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Honorable Dougiaj s Cornaby 
D i s t r i c t Court iJludqe 
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APPENDIX D 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 31A-21-301 
PART II 
APPROVAL OF FORMS 
31A-21-201. Filing and approval of forms. 
(1) No form subject to Subsection 31A-21-10H1), except as exempted under 
Subsections 31A-21-10K2) through 31A-21-10H6), may be used unless it has 
been filed with the commissioner. 
(2) (a) The commissioner may at any time disapprove a form upon a finding 
that: 
(i) it is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive, 
obscure, or encourages misrepresentation; 
(ii) it provides benefits or contains other provisions that endanger 
the solidity of the insurer; 
(iii) in the case of the basic policy, though not applicable to riders 
and endorsements, it fails to provide the exact name of the insurer 
and its state of domicile; or 
(iv) it violates a statute or a rule adopted by the commissioner, or 
is otherwise contrary to law. 
(b) Whenever the commissioner disapproves a form under Subsection 
(2)(a), the commissioner may order that, on or before a date not less than 
30 nor more than 90 days after the order, the use of the form be discontin-
ued or that appropriate changes be made. 
(c) The commissioner's disapproval under this Subsection (2) shall be 
in writing and constitutes an order. This order shall state the reasons for 
disapproval in reasonable detail to guide the insurer in reformulating its 
proposals or appealing the order. 
(3) Insurance policy forms need not conform to the requirements of this 
chapter until July 1, 1987, though insurance policies issued after July 1,1986, 
are subject to Section 31A-21-107. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-201, enacted by amendment, effective September 5, 1988, sub-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, stituted "its state of domicile" for "the full ad-
§ 7. dress of its home or regional office" in Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 (2nd S.SJ tion i2)(aMiii). 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in other statutes, or by 
rule under Subsection (l)(c), this section applies to all policies of insur-
ance other than life and disability insurance and annuities, if they are 
issued on forms which are subject to filing and approval under Subsection 
31A-21-20K1). 
(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to insureds than this 
section requires. 
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially exempt from this 
section classes of insurance policies in which the insureds do not need 
protection against arbitrary or unannounced termination. 
(d) The rights provided by this section are in addition to and do not 
prejudice any other rights the insureds may have at common law or under 
other statutes. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), no insurance policy may be 
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed term or one 
year from the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever is less, 
except for failure to pay a premium when due or on grounds stated in the 
policy. As used in this subsection, "grounds" means: 
(i) material misrepresentation; 
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed, unless the insurer 
should reasonably have foreseen the change or contemplated the risk 
when entering into the contract; 
(hi) substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions, or war-
ranties: 
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the terminal age for cover-
age, in which case the insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection 
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional return of premium; or 
(v) in the case of automobile insurance, revocation or suspension of 
the driver's license of the named insured or any other person who 
customarily drives the car. 
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or first class mailing of a 
written notice to the policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsec-
tion (2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium, is effective. 
Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is effective no sooner than ten 
days after delivery or first class mailing. Notice of cancellation for non-
payment of premium shall include a statement of the reason for cancella-
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tion. Subsection (6) applies to the notice required for other grounds of 
cancellation. 
(c) Subsections (2)1 SL) and <b) do not apply to any insurance contract 
that has not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect 
less than 60 days when the notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered. 
No cancellation under this subsection is effective until at least (10) days 
after the delivery to the insured of a written notice of cancellation. If the 
notice is sent by tirst class mail, postage prepaid, to the insured at his last 
known address, delivery is considered accomplished after the passing, 
since the mailing date, of the mailing time specified in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Policy cancellations subject to this subsection are not 
subject to the procedures described in Subsection (6). 
(3) A policy may be issued for a term longer than one year or for an indefi-
nite term, with a clause providing for cancellation by the insurer by giving 
notice as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(i) 30 days prior to any anniversaury 
date. 
(4) (a) Subject to Subsections (2), (3), (4Kb), and (4)(c), a policyholder has a 
right to have the policy renewed, on the terms then being applied by the 
insurer to similar risks, for an additional period of time equivalent to the 
expiring term if the agreed term is one year or less, or for one year if the 
agreed term is longer than one year. 
(b) The right to renewal mder Subsection (4)(a) is extinguished if: 
(i) at least 30 days p< or to the policy expiration or anniversary 
date a notice of intention not to renew the policy beyond the agreed 
expiration or anniversary date is delivered or sent by first class mail 
by the insurer to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known 
address: 
(ii) not more than 45 nor less than 14 days prior to the due date of 
the renewal premium, the insurer delivers or sends by first class mail 
a notice to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known address, 
clearly stating the renewal premium, how it may be paid, and that 
failure to pay the renewal premium by the due date extinguishes the 
policyholder's right to renewal: 
(iii) the policyholder has accepted replacement coverage, or has 
requested or agreed to nonrenewal: or 
(iv) the policy is expressly designated as nonrenewable. 
(5) (a) Subject to Subsection (5)(b), if the insurer offers or purports to renew 
the policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, the new terms or 
rates take effect on the renewal date if the insurer delivered or sent by 
first class mail to the policyholder notice of the new terms or rates at least 
30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy. If the insurer did 
not give this prior notification to the policyholder, the new terms or rates 
do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is delivered or sent by first 
class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect to cancel the renewal 
policy at any time during the 30-day period. Return premiums or addi-
tional premium charges shall be calculated proportionately on the basis 
that the old rates apply. 
(b) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply if the only change in terms that is 
adverse to the policyholder is a rate increase generally applicable to the 
class of business to which the policy belongs, a rate increase resulting 
from a classification change based on the altered nature or extent of the 
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risk insured against, or a policy form change made to make the form 
consistent with Utah law. 
(6) If a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal under Subsection (2Kb) does 
not state with reasonable precision the facts on which the insurer's decision is 
based, the insurer shall send by first class mail or deliver that information 
within ten working days after receipt of a written request by the policyholder. 
This notice is not effective unless it contains information about the policy-
holder's right to make the request. 
(7) If a risk-sharing plan under Section 31A-2-214 exists for the kind of 
coverage provided by the insurance being cancelled or nonrenewed, no notice 
of cancellation or nonrenewal required under Subsection (2Kb) or (4)(b)(i) is 
effective unless it contains instructions to the policyholder for applying for 
insurance through the available risk-sharing plan. 
(8) There is no liability on the pan of, and no cause of action against, any 
insurer, its authorized representatives, agents, employees, or any other per-
son furnishing to the insurer information relating to the reasons for cancella-
tion or nonrenewal or for any statement made or information given by them 
in complying or enabling the insurer to comply with this section unless actual 
malice is proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
(9) This section does not alter any common law right of contract rescission 
for material misrepresentation. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-303, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 144; 
1987, ch. 91, § 47; 1987, ch. 95, § 26. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 91, made a minor change in 
phraseology in Subsection (7). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 95, efTec-
Renewal. 
—Nonpayment. 
As a matter of law. an insurer did not waive 
its right to refuse a late renewal payment and 
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "fi-
nancial responsibility" automobile insurance, 
44 A.L.R.4th 13. 
Fidelity bond termination clause on taking 
over of insured by another business entity: con-
struction ana effect, 44 A.L.R.4th 1195. 
tive March 16, 1987, substituted "30" for "20" 
in the first sentence of Subsection (2Kb). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Although referred to 
in Subsection (4)(a), as enacted and amended, 
this section contains no Subsection (4)(c). 
deny coverage, by its conduct in previously ac-
cepting a late installment payment. Clarke v. 
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policv providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
31A-21-304. Special cancellation provisions. 
Whether or not Section 31A-21-303 is also applicable: 
(1) Section 31A-21-305 applies to cancellation on request of a premium 
imance company; 
a Jd ) S e C t l ° n 7 0 C * 6 " 3 0 4 aPP"es to cancellation upon request of a creditor; 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 31A-21-312 
(3) Sections 41-12a-404 and 41-12a-405 apply to the cancellation or 
other termination of insurance coverage or of a surety bond after the 
insurer or surety has provided a certificate of insurance or suretyship to 
the Department of Public Safety. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-304. enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
L. 1985, ch. 242, 4 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 145; ment, in Subsection (2), substituted "70C-6-
1987, ch. 91, § 48. 304" for "70B-4-304." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "fi-
nancial responsibility" automobile insurance, 
44 A.L.R.4th 13. 
70C-6-304. Cancellation by creditor. 
A creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or liability 
insurance except after the debtor's default or in accordance with a written 
authorization by the debtor, and in either case the cancellation does not take 
effect until written notice is delivered to the debtor or mailed to him at his 
address as stated by him. The notice shall state that the policy may be can-
celled on a date not less than ten days after the notice is delivered, or, if the 
notice is mailed, not less than 13 days after it is mailed. 
